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Abstract 
Segregation is widespread in all realms of human society. Several influential studies have argued 
that intolerance is not a prerequisite for a segregated society, and that segregation can arise even 
when people generally prefer diversity. We investigated this paradox experimentally, by letting 
groups of high-school students play four different real-time interactive games. Incentives for 
neighbor similarity produced segregation, but incentives for neighbor dissimilarity and 
neighborhood diversity prevented it. The participants continued to move while their game scores 
were below optimal, but their individual moves did not consistently take them to the best 
alternative position. These small differences between human and simulated agents produced 
different segregation patterns than previously predicted, thus challenging conclusions about 
segregation arising from these models. 
 
Introduction 
Even if people are generally tolerant, they can end up living in a segregated society if they have 
weak preferences to be among similar others. This was the counter-intuitive conclusion derived 
from Schelling’s model of segregation (1, 2), one of the most influential models of tipping 
dynamics and unintended consequences (3-5). The most common version of the model is a 
simulation in which agents of two different colors are placed on a grid. On each time step of the 
simulation, the agents move position depending on the color of their eight nearest neighbors. For 
example, the agents move if less than 50% of their neighbors have the same color as themselves 
(Figure 1A). Even when everyone has these relatively mild preferences for similar neighbors and 
no one prefers a segregated local neighborhood, the model dynamics result in extreme 
segregation at the population level (Figure 1E). 
Subsequent theoretical research has shown that even when individuals actively seek 
diversity, segregation may still be a likely outcome (6-8). These models assume that the larger the 
proportion of same-color neighbors, the less satisfied the agents are and the more likely they are 
to move (as in, for example, Figure 1C). Despite diversity providing higher utility, the 
simulations predict a surprisingly high level of segregation (Figure 1G). 
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When considering questions of public policy, both economists and sociologists have 
emphasized the importance of these results. For example, (8) conclude that “segregation can 
emerge…even among multiculturalists who actively seek diversity, so long as they are also 
sensitive to small changes in ethnic composition.” Moreover, (7) suggest that the “welfare effect 
of educating people to have preferences for integration might be adverse” because the 
“segregated outcome will be unsatisfying for the majority of people.” The practical implications 
are clear: if the theoretical predictions are true, public policies that promote openness and 
tolerance are futile because they cannot improve integration. 
Despite their importance for policy, the predictions of the segregation models have not 
been extensively tested empirically before. Most of the previous work has investigated what kind 
of preferences for neighborhood composition individuals from different racial and ethnic groups 
hold and what level of segregation these preferences produce if plugged into the models (4, 10-
12). The question whether particular preferences indeed cause the predicted outcomes has 
received less attention. Answering this question with observational data is extremely difficult 
since there are multiple correlated factors that influence a person’s moving decision (13). For 
example, in a residential setting, the decision to move a house is affected not only by the ethnic 
composition of the current and future neighborhood, but also by the household’s income, the 
price of real estate, proximity to the workplace, etc. (4). In a conference room or a lecture hall, 
the decision to pick a particular seat may be influenced by the characteristics of the seating 
neighbors but may also have to do with when one enters the room or one’s personality type (14).  
The best method to isolate the effect of a behavioral factor is to conduct a controlled 
experiment (15-17). So far there has been only one small-scale experimental test of a one-
dimensional version of the Schelling model (i.e. with a utility function as in Figure 1A) (18). We 
therefore designed, conducted, and analyzed an experiment to test the predictions of the two-
dimensional segregation model for four different utility functions, representing different 
preferences for local similarity, diversity, and difference. For simplicity, we refer to the 
corresponding games as “Same,” “Same and Diverse,” “Diverse,” and “Same or Different” 
(Figure 1A-D).  
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Materials and Methods 
We conducted the experiments with 20 high school classes in Sweden. The classes had between 
13 and 25 students, providing a total of 399 participants, aged between 16 and 19. To recruit the 
classes, we identified mathematics teachers in three different regions of Sweden (east coast, 
middle, and west coast) and contacted them with the offer to lead an hour-long interactive 
demonstration on mathematical modeling of social processes during one of their class sessions. 
The experimental sessions were conducted at the beginning of the demonstrations and introduced 
as a game with no reference made to segregation. Each participant was given a surf tablet to use 
as a game controller and assigned a number and a color for their avatar (Figure S2). The game 
was projected on a shared screen at the front of the classroom (Figure S3). The game field was a 
six-by-six square grid on which avatars could be moved up, down, left, or right. Participants 
played four games with scoring rules equivalent to the four utility functions (Figure 1A-D), in 
randomized order. Participants could observe their current score in real time throughout the 
game, but only the score at the end of the game counted. Each game was stopped when all 
participants indicated that they did not want to move any further, or after 2 minutes of play.  
An important novelty of our experimental design is that it was performed in a naturally 
occurring social environment. Most game experiments reported in the literature place subjects in 
isolated booths in computer laboratories, do not allow communication, and incentivize 
performance with monetary payments. By running our games in classrooms, using tablets, and 
having interactions occur on a shared screen, we gave participants the opportunity to interact 
naturally, while still being able to record all of their game actions. We allowed participants to 
communicate with each other but this did not significantly de-anonymize their interactions 
(Figure S4). We did not offer monetary incentives but the games were very dynamic (3.8 moves 
per second on average) and caused a lot of excitement and exclamations during game play. We 
provided a social incentive to perform well by informing participants in advance that their total 
score from the four games would be projected on the screen at the end of the experiment. 
Results 
In the Same game, participants produced slightly higher levels of segregation and average scores 
than the model predictions (Figure 2A, 3A). In 17 out of the 20 trials the participants separated in 
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two distinct groups at either side or corner of the grid (as in Figure 1I). The Same game was the 
easiest game for the participants to complete: nearly all groups converged to the end-game 
segregation and average scores in less than 30 seconds of play (Figure S5). This was because it 
quickly became apparent which side “belonged” to which color.  
For the Diverse game, the segregation was low and similar to the model predictions. The 
participants continued to move for the entire two minutes of the experiment (Figure S5) but they 
eventually achieved the expected good levels of integration (Figure 2B) and high average scores 
(Figure 3B). 
The experimental results for the Same and Diverse game did not reveal marked levels of 
segregation, contradicting model predictions. In most cases, participants actually achieved a good 
degree of integration (Figure 2C). Yet, their scores were not always lower than the simulated 
agents’ scores (Figure 3C). The high level of segregation in the simulation was due to the fact 
that a small number of agents quickly formed “a frontline” that offered the ideal mix of own- and 
other-color neighbors; the rest of the agents were doomed to less-than-optimal positions and 
logically, they chose the own-color side of the borderline (Figure 1G). In contrast, experiment 
participants achieved a more uniform mix (Figure 1K), similar to the pattern in the Diverse game 
(Figure 1J). 
The experimental results for the Same or Different game also deviated from the model. The 
students tended to have higher levels of segregation (Figure 2D). Further, based on the average 
scores, it is clear that the participants did worse in the game than the simulation agents (Figure 
3D). A priori, we expected that the participants would recognize that the “same” strategy was 
much easier to coordinate on and hence, they would converge to high levels of segregation, as 
they easily did in the Same game. During the experiments, students made repeated references to 
such a strategy, shouting things like “all the yellows up to the top.” Four groups attempted to 
carry out this approach but it took only a few contrarians to upset the pattern (Figure S5D). 
However, no group managed to achieve the simpler one-color-neighborhood solution. The 
students also made suggestions about checkerboard solutions like “we should alternate….blue 
then yellow” or “we’ll stand in groups of four two of each with one square distance between.” 
Three groups managed to coordinate (or nearly coordinate) to create these more difficult 
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checkerboard solutions. The rest of the groups failed to get close to a mutually beneficial 
configuration within the allotted time. 
The vast majority of moves made by the participants were consistent with an attempt to 
maximize the utility functions provided to them. Figure 4 shows the average latency until a move 
is made as a function of neighbor types for the four games. Movement patterns differed greatly 
between games, but were consistent across trials within a game. The timing of the moves 
reflected a strong tendency towards higher scoring configurations. For example, in the Same 
game individuals with zero same neighbors typically moved after less than 2 seconds, while those 
with 5 or more same neighbors would remain stationary for more than 20 seconds. The 
motivation to get high scores was also reflected in the students’ discussions and exclamations 
during gameplay. These were primarily about maximizing points, and at no time in any of the 
trials did any of the students make any wider reference to segregation.  Both the actions (in terms 
of movements made in the game) and verbal expressions were thus consistent with our 
assumption that the participants saw the game in terms of utility maximization. 
Although the participants followed the incentives we assigned them, they produced 
different outcomes than seen in models. Previous research suggests that this could be due to 
significantly high levels of behavior noise (8). Our participants inadvertently committed errors 
but the errors were not the driving mechanism. Instead, it appears that the participants used a 
strategy that differed from the one implemented in the simulation models. In line with previous 
work (6-8), our model assumes the best-response strategy, according to which individuals change 
their position only if it increases their utility. This implies that individuals are able not only to 
identify better positions but also to recognize when no better positions exist. However, given the 
fast game dynamics, the participants in our experiment faced cognitive limitations in identifying 
the optimal locations. In addition, they appeared to be unwilling to “satisfice.” The participants 
moved whenever they did not obtain the perfect score. This is evident from the high mobility in 
less-than-optimal positions in Figure 4B-D. Moreover, when they moved, the participants did not 
necessarily move to better positions but rather, appeared to choose their new location randomly 
(Figure S7). These behavioral rules led to unpredictability and no stable equilibrium arrangement 
was achieved. 
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The participants’ behavior explains the mismatch with the predictions of the best-response 
simulation model. In the Same game, the participants obtained more segregated outcomes 
because they wanted to avoid being on the frontier between the two neighborhoods, as this made 
them more vulnerable to other participants’ moves. In the Same and Diverse game, the 
participants avoided segregation because they could not be satisfied with being at the periphery 
of their own-color neighborhood, as these positions entailed lower scores. In the Same or 
Different game, the participants failed to coordinate on the common-sense solution based on two 
groupings of yellow and blue because their scores could be easily lowered by one individual of 
the opposite color infiltrating a mono-color block.  
To further test our explanation for the experimental results, we replicated the simulation 
assuming random relocation and no satisficing. In the new model, agents decide to move 
whenever their utility is less than the maximum. They then move to a location chosen at random. 
The predictions from this model match the observed outcomes better, particularly for the Same 
and Diverse game and the Same or Different game (Figure S8).  
Discussion 
In large cities, people move rental housing and workplaces relatively often, and sometimes 
without full information about the make up of the new place. Still, residential and work 
segregation take place on longer time scales, over wider areas, and with much larger costs and 
benefits than in the experiments we have carried out. We should therefore be careful how we 
interpret our experimental results in a wider context. Nevertheless, it is important to note that 
experiments on humans, even on a short time scale, are likely to be more relevant to policy 
making than simulation results alone. The strong conclusions of  (7) and (8), quoted in the 
introduction, are not supported by our experiment. In the Same and Diverse experiment, 
segregation is low and those individuals scoring poorly had inadvertently moved in to areas with 
slightly too high concentrations of dissimilar neighbors. On this basis, these models should not be 
used as an argument against the need to educate people in the benefits of diversity and we should 
not conclude that real-world segregation is an unavoidable consequence of weak preferences. 
The differences between the experiment and the simulation show how aspects of human 
psychology that are not captured in simplified simulation models may affect outcomes at the 
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group or society level. The participants in our experiment behaved rationally in the sense that 
they acted to maximize their utility. Yet, the patterns they created were characteristic to humans 
rather than simulated agents.  Because our experimental games allowed for asynchronous and 
repeated interactions in a social setting, they were sufficiently flexible to reveal these patterns. 
The results show that even in a simple setting, humans can act according to the incentives we 
give them while simultaneously defying our models of what they will do. 
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Figures and Figure Captions 
 
 
Figure 1. Utility functions, representative simulation outcomes, and representative 
experiment outcomes for the four games. The figure shows the utility functions used in the 
simulations (and equivalently, the scoring rules in the experiment), a typical outcome in the 
simulation for a group size of 20, and the outcomes in one of the experimental groups with 20 
participants, for the Same game (A, E, I), the Diverse game (B, F, J), the Same and Diverse 
game (C, G, K), and the Same or Different game (D, H, L). 
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Figure 2. The segregation reached at the end of each game in the experiment compared to 
the predictions from the simulations. Segregation is measured as the average percent similar 
neighbors. Results are shown for (A) the Same game, (B) the Diverse game, (C) the Same and 
Diverse game, and (D) the Same or Different game. 
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Figure 3. The average score achieved at the end of each game in the experiment compared 
to the predictions from the simulations. Results are shown for (A) the Same game, (B) the 
Diverse game, (C) the Same and Diverse game, and (D) the Same or Different game. 
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Figure 4. Average time until next move as a function of the number of different and same 
neighbors. Results are shown for (A) the Same game, (B) the Diverse game, (C) the Same and 
Diverse game, and (D) the Same or Different game. Times are estimated by first calculating the 
total time each neighbor configuration (same, different) is observed over all individuals in all 
experimental groups. This time is then divided by the number of occurrences of a move away 
from that configuration. 
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1. Simulation 
Our simulation to a large extent replicates the model studied by (7). Agents in the model are 
situated on a two-dimensional 6x6 grid. At every time period, an agent is selected uniformly at 
random from the population and given the opportunity to relocate if it is unsatisfied. The agents 
have local information and evaluate the nearest four available locations in the up, down, left and 
right directions, as well as their current location. If agents identify a single strictly best available 
location among these, they move to (or stay at) it; if they identify multiple best locations, they 
randomly choose to relocate to one of them. Thus, as in (7), we assume that agents use a myopic 
best response, while we also restrict the agents’ information and movement to more accurately 
reflect our experimental design. 
To generate predictions for the experiments, we ran 1000 simulations for each utility 
function in Fig. 1A-D and each population size in the range 13-25. We ran each simulation for 
100,000 time periods and recorded the outcome in the last period, regardless of whether a stable 
equilibrium was reached. 
Our results largely replicate the results in (7). We find that segregation obtains even in the 
presence of a preference for diversity (segregation is similar for the Same and the Same and 
Diverse utility function) and that integration is possible only when there is no homophily (i.e. for 
the Diverse utility function; Fig. S1A). In other words, segregation results from the asymmetry 
of preferences for similar and different neighbors. Segregation obtains for the Same and Diverse 
utility function because the best-response dynamics eliminate ideal locations quickly and leave 
only less satisfactory ones. Thus, the dynamics pose a coordination problem – agents need to 
collectively coordinate on more optimal outcomes, which also happen to be the less segregated 
equilibria. 
Generally, the equilibria for the Same and Diverse utility function are characterized by low 
average scores (Fig. S1B). Compared to the Same utility function, adding diversity only slightly 
lowers segregation but at the cost of a large drop in collective happiness. In contrast, preference 
for diversity without homophily (the Diverse utility function) achieves ideal integration at only 
slightly lower efficiency than just homophily (the Same utility function). 
The Diverse utility function also produces the outcomes with highest clustering (Fig. S1C). 
While pure homophily (Same) results in a segregated world with clusters with clear boundaries, 
pure preference for diversity (Diverse) produces tightly knit and well-integrated communities. 
The results are largely robust to alternative information and moving rules, as long as the 
myopic best-response assumption remains. The results hold if we assume global information and 
global movement, as in (7). They also hold if we assume that agents pick the best location on the 
whole grid but can only move to the nearest empty spot toward it in one of the four major 
directions, that is, if we assume global information and local movement. These analyses are not 
reported here but are available from the authors upon request.    
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Fig. S1. The predictions from the simulations for group size 20. Results are shown for (A) 
average percent of same-color neighbors, (B) average score, and (C) average number of 
neighbors. 
 
2. Experiment Design 
The experiments were conducted as part of an interactive demonstration on mathematical 
modeling that we presented to high school students in Sweden. The demonstrations aimed to 
combine disseminating scientific ideas to the general public with collecting data for research. We 
conducted the sessions in November 2014, December 2014 and March 2015.  
Using this population group had a number of advantages and disadvantages. In Sweden, 
minors in schools do not require parental permission to participate in research conducted during 
regular class sessions. This age group has almost universal familiarity with computer games and 
digital devices. This meant that the participants would not only understand the game rules and 
the game interface more readily but would also be more engaged in playing the game. The latter 
was particularly important since we were not allowed to use monetary incentives in the school 
context.  
We recruited classes from schools in the Uppland, Väster-götland and Dalarna provinces, 
which are in the east, the west, and the center of Sweden, respectively. The sample included both 
urban and rural, and both public and privately managed schools. The schools also largely varied 
in size. The classes we selected were from non-vocational specializations only, since they tend to 
have more extensive training in Mathematics. The contacted teachers were instructed not to 
inform the students what the session would involve, rather to say that researchers from Uppsala 
and Cornell University would allow them to participate in an experimental game on “modeling 
social processes.” 
The games were designed to be as simple and intuitive to play as possible. We restricted 
movement to a grid, rather than a torus, and to the four main directions, instead of including 
diagonal movement. We used numbers for the avatars to make them easy to track during the fast 
game dynamics. We presented the utility function in the form of a score bar, which is a common 
element in computer games (Fig. S2). Most importantly, we allowed decisions to happen in real 
time, rather than in periods (Fig. S3). On the one hand, this made the games stimulating and 
engaging. On the other hand, it helped us avoid forcing the model dynamics on the interactions 
in the experiment and consequently, prevented us from “cooking in” the theoretical predictions.  
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Fig. S2. A screenshot of the game control as it was seen on a surf tablet. 
 
We allowed communication during the games as students were in close proximity and full 
visibility of each other. The play caused a lot of excitement and loud comments, including 
exclamations of joy for obtaining high score, as well as curses about neighbors who misbehaved. 
Almost always, there were also students who suggested coordinating strategies to mutually solve 
the game. For example, in the Same game, someone would yell something similar to “blues to 
the left, yellows to the right.” Surprisingly, this opportunity to coordinate strategies was not 
always successful. The fact that only three groups managed to coordinate on a checkerboard 
pattern and zero on a segregated pattern in the Same or Different Game demonstrates this.  
At the beginning of the experiment, students’ ID numbers were placed face down on their 
desk or chair. However, due to students being in close physical proximity to each other in the 
classroom, it was impossible to prevent them from sharing their ID with their neighbors. Further, 
the ID numbers were in order, as we needed to record the exact seating arrangement both for the 
demonstrations and for research, and hence students could potentially extrapolate the numbers 
for everyone else. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that this “weak anonymity” systematically 
biased participants’ behavior (Fig. S4). The games were so fast-paced (3.8 moves per second on 
average) that it was impossible to keep in mind other players’ IDs and colors. 
 
5 
 
 
Fig. S3. A screenshot of the game, which was projected on a screen at the front of the classroom. 
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Fig. S4. The average percent of participants’ two immediate neighbors in the classroom (to the 
left and right) who were also neighbors at the end of each game in the experiment compared to 
the expected percent if individuals were randomly assigned to classroom seats. Results are 
shown for (A) the Same game, (B) the Diverse game, (C) the Same and Diverse game, and (D) 
the Same or Different game. 
	  
3.	  Experiment	  Software	  
The	  game	  platform	  was	  developed	  as	  a	  Node.js	  application,	  entirely	  written	  in	  JavaScript	  and	  HTML	  5.	  
The	  application	  uses	  the	  WebSocket	  protocol	  to	  allow	  for	  an	  ongoing	  two-­‐way	  communication	  between	  
the	  server	  and	  the	  browser.	  Data	  are	  saved	  in	  a	  MongoDB	  database,	  which	  is	  a	  NoSQL	  database	  using	  
JSON-­‐like	  documents	  with	  dynamic	  schemas.	  All	  used	  software	  is	  free	  and	  open-­‐source	  and	  the	  scripts	  
and	  communication	  protocol	  are	  compatible	  with	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  commercial	  web	  browsers.	  The	  
source	  code	  for	  the	  game	  platform	  is	  available	  from	  the	  authors	  upon	  request.	  
 
4. Experiment Protocol 
Students in the classes knew that they would be given an interactive demonstration on modeling 
a social phenomenon but were not informed what that social phenomenon was. At the beginning 
of the demonstration, they were informed that their decisions and answers would be recorded for 
research but kept confidential. The demonstration started with a brief description of the game 
setup. Then, students logged in the tablets with their assigned ID number, provided their first 
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name, and answered a four-question survey. The survey asked them to indicate their gender 
(female or male), preferred pet (cat or dog), preferred school subject (Math or Swedish), and 
preferred leisure activity (computer games or outdoors). This information was used for the 
demonstration and the data collection process only. Specifically, we deleted the names from the 
database once we collected all data. 
Students then played a trial run and after that, the four games in randomized order. Each 
time, they were given brief instructions about the score rules in the particular game and then 
allowed two minutes to play. The score rules were projected on the screen and thus, participants 
knew that they were all playing the same game. After the games, students were asked to 
complete a short survey on their national origin, academic aspirations, family socioeconomic 
status, and social network. Then, their final scores were revealed in a list on the screen. 
At	  that	  moment,	  we	  revealed	  that	  the	  games	  were	  based	  on	  a	  mathematical	  model	  of	  
segregation.	  We	  then	  gave	  a	  lecture	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  segregation	  and	  the	  Schelling	  model.	  In	  the	  
lecture,	  we	  used	  the	  students’	  answers	  from	  the	  first	  four-­‐question	  survey	  and	  the	  final	  configurations	  
in	  the	  games	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  problem	  of	  segregation	  and	  the	  model.	  Additionally,	  the	  
demonstration	  included	  a	  ten-­‐minute	  segment	  in	  which	  students	  were	  asked	  to	  run	  simulations	  of	  the	  
model	  (using	  a	  web	  application	  we	  had	  developed)	  in	  order	  to	  answer	  a	  few	  questions	  about	  the	  model	  
behavior.	  The	  introduction	  and	  the	  games	  were	  lead	  in	  Swedish,	  while	  the	  lecture	  was	  given	  in	  English.	  
The	  following	  is	  the	  original	  English	  version	  of	  the	  demonstration	  protocol.	  This	  version	  was	  
translated	  into	  Swedish	  for	  the	  experiments:	  
	  
Segregation	  in	  Minutes	  
	  
“Segregation	  in	  Minutes”	  is	  an	  educational	  demonstration	  and	  behavioral	  study	  that	  uses	  a	  web-­‐based	  
platform	  and	  an	  online	  real-­‐time	  multi-­‐player	  game.	  The	  session	  is	  introduced	  to	  students	  as	  an	  
interactive	  lesson	  on	  mathematical	  modelling.	  To	  prevent	  behavioral	  and	  response	  bias,	  it	  is	  important	  
not	  to	  reveal	  the	  topic	  of	  segregation	  to	  students	  before	  all	  data	  have	  been	  collected	  (see	  below).	  
The	  goal	  of	  the	  session	  is	  twofold:	  	  
1) to	  demonstrate	  basic	  concepts	  of	  segregation	  to	  students	  according	  to	  the	  Schelling	  model;	  	  
2) to	  collect	  data	  on	  individual	  and	  collective	  behavior	  for	  research.	  	  
Required	  Equipment	  
• 25	  surf	  tablets	  with	  a	  browser	  with	  capability	  for	  web	  sockets	  to	  serve	  as	  game	  “consoles”	  for	  
each	  student	  	  
• Instructor’s	  laptop	  
• 36	  ID	  cards,	  numbered	  from	  1	  to	  36	  (the	  login	  ID)	  
• Overhead	  projector	  and	  screen	  
Method	  
1) Setup	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 Arrange	  the	  seats	  in	  the	  classroom	  on	  a	  6x6	  square	  grid.	  On	  each	  seat,	  place	  one	  of	  the	  
ID	  cards	  facing	  down.	  Arrange	  the	  cards	  so	  that	  the	  numbering	  increases	  consecutively	  
from	  left	  to	  right	  and	  then	  from	  top	  to	  bottom:	  	  
	  
	  
 Choose	  (uniquely)	  one	  of	  the	  orders	  in	  which	  Game	  1,	  Game	  2,	  Game	  3,	  and	  Game	  4	  will	  
be	  played	  in	  the	  session.	  
1,	  2,	  3,	  4	   	   	   3,	  1,	  2,	  4	   	  
1,	  2,	  4,	  3	   	   	   3,	  1,	  4,	  2	   	  
1,	  3,	  2,	  4	   	   	   3,	  2,	  1,	  4	   	  
1,	  3,	  4,	  2	   	   	   3,	  2,	  4,	  1	   	  
1,	  4,	  2,	  3	   	   	   3,	  4,	  1,	  2	   	  
1,	  4,	  3,	  2	   	   	   3,	  4,	  2,	  1	   	  
2,	  1,	  3,	  4	   	   	   4,	  1,	  2,	  3	   	  
2,	  1,	  4,	  3	   	   	   4,	  1,	  3,	  2	   	  
2,	  3,	  1,	  4	   	   	   4,	  2,	  1,	  3	   	  
2,	  3,	  4,	  1	   	   	   4,	  2,	  3,	  1	   	  
2,	  4,	  1,	  3	   	   	   4,	  3,	  1,	  2	   	  
2,	  4,	  3,	  1	   	   	   4,	  3,	  2,	  1	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 Log	  in	  to	  the	  site	  as	  admin	  and	  set	  up	  the	  session.	  
	  
2) Students	  enter	  
	  
 Welcome.	  Please	  take	  a	  seat.	  You	  can	  sit	  wherever	  you	  would	  like.	  	  
	  
3) (3	  min)	  Introduction	  
	  
 I	  will	  start	  by	  reading	  you	  the	  instructions	  for	  this	  session.	  
 You	  are	  about	  to	  participate	  in	  an	  interactive	  demonstration	  on	  mathematical	  modeling.	  
(Mathematical	  modeling	  is	  about	  describing	  events	  with	  the	  help	  of	  mathematics.)	  First,	  
you	  will	  play	  4	  different	  games.	  The	  tablets	  will	  serve	  as	  game	  controls;	  the	  game	  itself	  
will	  be	  projected	  on	  the	  screen.	  Then,	  you	  will	  be	  asked	  to	  fill	  out	  a	  short	  survey.	  Finally,	  
you	  will	  explore	  an	  interactive	  simulation	  model	  on	  which	  the	  games	  are	  based.	  
 At	  the	  beginning,	  we	  will	  ask	  you	  for	  your	  name	  but	  we	  will	  need	  it	  only	  for	  the	  
demonstration.	  Eventually,	  we	  will	  anonymize	  all	  information	  and	  your	  name	  will	  be	  
deleted.	  Your	  answers	  and	  decisions	  will	  be	  saved	  for	  research	  on	  mathematical	  
modeling.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
4) 	  (7	  	  min)	  General	  game	  instructions	  
	  
 As	  I	  mentioned,	  we	  will	  start	  by	  playing	  4	  games.	  The	  games	  have	  different	  scoring	  rules	  
but	  in	  each	  game,	  your	  goal	  is	  to	  score	  the	  highest	  number	  of	  points	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
game.	  
 In	  each	  game,	  your	  avatar	  is	  shown	  by	  a	  colored	  circle	  with	  a	  number.	  Your	  avatar	  will	  
be	  one	  of	  two	  colors:	  either	  yellow	  or	  blue.	  All	  avatars	  are	  situated	  on	  a	  grid.	  	  	  
 On	  the	  grid,	  you	  can	  move	  your	  avatar	  left,	  right,	  up,	  or	  down	  to	  the	  next	  empty	  spot	  in	  
the	  specified	  direction,	  if	  such	  a	  spot	  exists.	  If	  the	  spot	  immediately	  next	  to	  you	  is	  
occupied	  by	  another	  avatar,	  you	  will	  jump	  to	  the	  next	  empty	  spot.	  If	  you	  are	  at	  the	  edge	  
of	  the	  grid	  and	  there	  are	  no	  more	  spots	  in	  the	  direction	  you	  want	  to	  move,	  you	  will	  not	  
move.	  	  
 In	  each	  game,	  your	  score	  depends	  on	  the	  color	  of	  your	  neighbors.	  A	  neighbor	  is	  anyone	  
who	  occupies	  one	  of	  the	  8	  cells	  surrounding	  you.	  Thus,	  you	  can	  have	  at	  most	  8	  
neighbors.	  However,	  if	  there	  are	  empty	  spots	  around	  you,	  you	  will	  have	  fewer	  than	  8	  
neighbors.	  
 You	  can	  use	  your	  game	  control	  to	  move	  your	  avatar	  and	  track	  your	  score.	  The	  heights	  of	  
the	  score	  bars	  show	  how	  many	  points	  you	  get	  for	  different	  percent	  of	  same-­‐color	  
neighbors.	  The	  red	  bar	  and	  the	  red	  text	  show	  your	  current	  score.	  
 The	  games	  have	  different	  scoring	  rules	  but	  in	  each	  game,	  your	  goal	  is	  to	  score	  the	  
highest	  number	  of	  points	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  game.	  Each	  game	  will	  end	  once	  everyone	  is	  
satisfied	  with	  their	  location	  and	  all	  movement	  has	  stopped,	  or	  after	  2	  minutes	  of	  play	  at	  
most.	  
 After	  we	  are	  done	  with	  all	  4	  games,	  we	  will	  display	  each	  person’s	  total	  score	  on	  the	  
screen.	  	  
	  
 Are	  there	  any	  questions?	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 Distribute	  tablets	  to	  all	  students.	  Describe	  how	  to	  handle	  the	  device.	  
 To	  turn	  the	  tablet	  on,	  press	  the	  button	  on	  the	  corner	  of	  one	  of	  the	  long	  sides.	  To	  go	  to	  
the	  desktop,	  press	  the	  arrow	  in	  the	  center	  at	  the	  very	  bottom	  of	  the	  screen.	  Please	  try	  
not	  to	  press	  any	  other	  buttons	  or	  icons	  because	  that	  will	  interrupt	  your	  game.	  Feel	  free	  
to	  rotate	  the	  tablet	  if	  you	  cannot	  view	  all	  of	  the	  information	  on	  the	  screen.	  
	  
 To	  log	  in,	  please	  click	  on	  the	  Play	  icon	  on	  the	  tablet	  screen.	  Please	  log	  in	  to	  the	  site	  with	  
the	  ID	  written	  on	  the	  card	  on	  your	  desk.	  Then,	  please	  submit	  the	  additional	  login	  
information.	  You	  will	  then	  reach	  the	  game	  control.	  However,	  we	  need	  to	  wait	  for	  
everyone	  to	  be	  done	  before	  you	  can	  use	  the	  game	  control.	  	  	  
	  
5) (4	  min)	  Trial	  Run	  
	  
 Wait	  for	  all	  students	  to	  complete	  the	  survey.	  
 Before	  you	  play	  the	  games,	  we	  will	  do	  a	  trial	  run	  so	  that	  you	  can	  practice	  how	  to	  use	  the	  
game	  control	  and	  how	  to	  follow	  your	  avatar	  on	  the	  screen.	  Your	  score	  from	  the	  trial	  run	  
will	  not	  be	  used	  for	  calculating	  your	  final	  score.	  The	  trial	  run	  is	  intended	  for	  practice	  only.	  
 Your	  score	  will	  be	  between	  5	  and	  100	  depending	  on	  the	  percent	  of	  same-­‐color	  neighbors	  
you	  have	  and	  the	  particular	  game	  you	  are	  playing.	  Each	  score	  bar	  corresponds	  to	  
different	  percent	  of	  same-­‐color	  neighbors:	  between	  0	  and	  9	  percent,	  between	  10	  and	  19	  
percent,	  and	  so	  on	  up	  to	  100	  percent.	  The	  height	  of	  each	  score	  bar	  shows	  how	  many	  
points	  you	  get	  if	  you	  have	  that	  percent	  of	  same-­‐color	  neighbors.	  The	  red	  bar	  corresponds	  
to	  your	  current	  neighborhood	  and	  the	  red	  text	  shows	  your	  current	  score.	  	  
 Select	   	  from	  the	  drop-­‐down	  menu	  and	   .	  Read	  the	  Trial	  
Run	  instructions.	   .	  
	  
6) (4	  x	  3	  min)	  Games	  
	  
 Now,	  we	  will	  play	  the	  4	  games.	  We	  will	  go	  over	  the	  scoring	  rules	  before	  each	  game.	  
Remember,	  the	  score	  you	  obtain	  at	  the	  end	  of	  each	  game	  will	  be	  used	  to	  calculate	  your	  
total	  score.	  At	  the	  end,	  we	  will	  display	  each	  person’s	  total	  score	  on	  the	  screen.	  
 For	  each	  of	  the	  four	  games:	  Select	  the	  game	  ( ,	   ,	  etc.)	  
according	  to	  the	  predetermined	  random	  order.	   .	  Read	  the	  game	  
instructions.	   .	  
	  
7) 	  (5	  min)	  Survey	  
	  
 Before	  we	  show	  you	  your	  final	  score,	  we	  would	  like	  to	  ask	  you	  to	  answer	  a	  short	  survey	  
that	  we	  need	  for	  research.	  Your	  answers	  will	  be	  kept	  confidential	  and	  not	  shared	  with	  
anyone	  who	  is	  not	  a	  researcher	  in	  our	  study.	  When	  you	  have	  completed	  the	  survey,	  
please	  leave	  the	  tablet	  in	  front	  of	  you	  on	  your	  desk.	  
	  
8) (1	  min)	  Final	  Scores	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 Click	  on	   	  to	  show	  student	  scores.	  
	  
9) 	  (10	  min)	  Lecture:	  Modeling	  Segregation	  
	  
 These	  games	  were	  designed	  to	  demonstrate	  to	  you	  the	  social	  phenomenon	  of	  
segregation.	  
! Show	  lecture	  slides	  1–19.	  
 Use	  simulation	  model	  to	  demonstrate	  segregation	  outcome	  in	  mathematical	  model.	  
	  results	  for	   	  compared	  to	   .	  
	  
! Show	  lecture	  slides	  20–21.	  
 	  results	  for	   	  compared	  to	  segregation	  in	  current	  seating	  
arrangement	  as	  per	  the	   .	  Use	   	  and	   	  to	  cycle	  
through	  the	  different	  survey	  answers.	  
! Show	  lecture	  slide	  22.	  
	  
10) (12	  min)	  Simulation	  model	  	  
	  
 Distribute	  task	  sheets	  to	  students.	  
! Show	  lecture	  slide	  23.	  
 You	  now	  have	  10	  min	  to	  use	  the	  simulation	  model	  and	  study	  what	  happens	  if	  people	  
prefer	  both	  similarity	  and	  diversity.	  You	  can	  work	  in	  pairs	  or	  in	  groups	  of	  3.	  	  
 To	  go	  to	  the	  simulation,	  please	  click	  on	  the	  Simulation	  icon	  on	  the	  tablet	  screen.	  
	  
11) 	  (5	  min)	  Lecture:	  Segregation	  and	  Integration	  
	  
 What	  did	  you	  find	  out?	  
 	  results	  for	   	  compared	  to	   .	  
 	  results	  for	   	  compared	  to	   .	  
! Show	  lecture	  slides	  24–26.	  
Legend	  
 To	  do	  
 To	  say	  
! To	  show	  from	  lecture	  slides	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5. Additional Analyses 
5.1. Time Series 
Our analysis of the game dynamics suggests that most of the experimental groups converged to a 
dynamic equilibrium within the allowed two minutes of play. The convergence was remarkably 
fast in the Same game (Fig. S5A and S5E) and relatively gradual in the Diverse game (Fig. S5F). 
There was very little change in the levels of segregation and the average scores in the Same and 
Diverse game (Fig. S5C and S5G), while the change in the levels of segregation in the Same or 
Different game shows a shift in strategies: an initial attempt at the “Same” strategy followed by 
the “Different” strategy. The latter game also exhibits the largest variation in dynamics and 
outcomes, similarly to the simulation predictions. 
 
 
Fig. S5. Time series of the level of segregation, the average score, and the average number of 
neighbors in the experiment. The figures show the mean and one standard deviation from the 
mean for the Same game (A, E, I), the Diverse game (B, F, J), the Same and Diverse game (C, 
G, K), and the Same or Different game (D, H, L). 
 
5.2. Clustering 
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Overall, the experimental groups achieved clustering that is similar to the clustering predicted by 
the simulations. There was only a slight tendency for the Same game to end more clustered than 
predicted and the Diverse game to be less clustered than predicted (Fig. S6).  
 
 
Fig. S6. The average number of neighbors at the end of each game in the experiment compared 
to the predictions from the simulations. Results are shown for (A) the Same game, (B) the 
Diverse game, (C) the Same and Diverse game, and (D) the Same or Different game. 
 
5.3 Movement Strategies 
We investigated whether the moves were score-maximizing by plotting the percent of moves that 
originated in a certain score that resulted in another score. If participants moved mainly to 
locations that increased their scores, we would expect a higher number of moves in the right half 
of the plots on Fig. S7.  Except for the Same game, this is clearly not the case. It appears that 
participants chose a random direction when they decided to move. There is no evidence that they 
preferred the nearest empty spot that increased their scores. 
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Fig. S7. The frequency of score changes as a result of a move. Results are shown for (A) the 
Same game, (B) the Diverse game, (C) the Same and Diverse game, and (D) the Same or 
Different game. The frequencies are normalized along each row. Each cell shows the proportion 
of moves away from a particular score (move-out score) that result in the move-in score.  
 
5.4. Simulation with Random Relocation 
To provide a better explanation for the experimental results, we replicated the simulation without 
the best-response assumption. In the new version, agents decide to relocate when they do not 
obtain the maximum utility at their current location and move to one of the nearest four available 
locations in the up, down, left and right directions chosen at random. The predictions from this 
model match the observed outcomes significantly better (Fig. S8).  
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Fig. S8. The segregation reached at the end of each game in the experiment compared to the 
predictions from a simulation model with random relocation. Segregation is measured as the 
average percent similar neighbors. Results are shown for (A) the Same game, (B) the Diverse 
game, (C) the Same and Diverse game, and (D) the Same or Different game. 
 
